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1231 
Comment 
BUILDING PICKET FENCES: MARYLAND’S FUNERAL 
PICKETING LAW AFTER SYNDER v. PHELPS 
MICHAEL BAKHAMA∗
In an episode of HBO’s television drama Six Feet Under, funeral 
director David Fisher presides over the funeral of a young man 
named Marc Foster, who has been brutally murdered for being gay.
 
1  
David, a devout Christian who is secretly gay, angrily confronts a 
group of anti-homosexual picketers at Foster’s funeral as they shout 
“God hates fags!” and “Your son is burning in hell!” at Foster’s griev-
ing family.2  One of the more vocal picketers proudly proclaims, “God 
killed Marc Foster and I’m here to celebrate!”3  In a fit of anger, Da-
vid rushes his antagonist and punches him in the face before being 
restrained by the police.4
In the United States today, dramas similar to the one portrayed 
in this scene occasionally unfold around the Westboro Baptist Church 
(“Westboro”), a radically anti-gay organization that has gained noto-
riety in recent years for picketing military funerals.
 
5  Westboro’s of-
fensive signs and slogans (most infamously “God Hates Fags”) pro-
voke public anger and, on some occasions, have led to violence.6
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 1. Six Feet Under: A Private Life (HBO television broadcast Aug. 19, 2001). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, A Peek Inside the Westboro Baptist Church, NPR.ORG (Mar. 2, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/02/134198937/a-peek-inside-the-westboro-baptist-
church.  
 6. See, e.g., 5 Arrested for Attacks on Anti-Gay Protesters at Military Funeral, FOX NEWS 
(May 22, 2006), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,196487,00.html (reporting a vio-
lent altercation between area residents and Westboro protesters, after which five people 
were criminally charged).   For additional information on this subject, see THE MOST 
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Maryland, a recent incident attracted national attention.  Westboro 
founder Fred Phelps, his daughters, and his grandchildren picketed 
the funeral of fallen marine Matthew Snyder.7  The picketing oc-
curred just prior to Snyder’s funeral service, on a plot of public land 
located about 1,000 feet from the funeral site.8  Unlike David Fisher, 
Snyder’s father had the good fortune to avoid the protesters on the 
way to and from his son’s funeral.9  But when he went home and 
watched news coverage of the protest, he experienced shock and an-
ger.10
In Snyder v. Phelps,
   
11 the United States Supreme Court held that 
the First Amendment shielded Phelps from paying compensatory 
damages to Snyder for the emotional distress inflicted by Phelps’s 
speech.12  Although it generated public controversy,13 the Court’s 8-1 
decision reflected a well-justified extension of its prevailing First 
Amendment jurisprudence, under which speech related to social and 
political concerns enjoys special constitutional protection.14
After Phelps’s protest at Snyder’s funeral, the Maryland General 
Assembly passed a statute that prohibits picketing within 500 feet of 
funeral services.
   
15  While Snyder properly shielded Westboro picketers 
from tort liability,16 it did not address the constitutionality of such 
“buffer zone” laws.17
 
HATED FAMILY IN AMERICA (BBC 2007) (documenting Westboro’s beliefs, activities, and 
picketing of funerals for U.S. soldiers) and AMERICA’S MOST HATED FAMILY IN CRISIS (BBC 
2011) (interviewing several of Phelps’s estranged family members who left the church after 
the first documentary).  
 
 7. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1213–14. 
 10. Id. 
 11. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 12. Id. at 1220–21. 
 13. See, e.g., Devin Dwyer, Westboro Baptist Church to “Quadruple” Funeral Protests After Rul-
ing, ABC NEWS (March 2, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Supreme 
_Court/westboro-baptist-church-quadruple-military-funeral-protests-supreme/story?id= 
13039045#.TwOl09S0wiA (noting opposition to the Court’s ruling by “a coalition of mili-
tary families”). 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 16. See infra Part II.A. 
 17. Snyder’s lawsuit against Phelps did not implicate any such statutes, so the Court 
mentioned them only in passing.  See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218 (“Maryland’s law . . . was not 
in effect at the time of the events at issue here, so we have no occasion to consider how it 
might apply to facts such as those before us, or whether it or other similar regulations are 
constitutional.”). 
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A recent split between the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and 
Eighth Circuits on the constitutionality of two laws similar to Mary-
land’s may soon be resolved as the Eighth Circuit rehears its case.  
Analyzing two virtually identical laws, creating 300-foot buffer zones 
around funerals during and for one hour before and after services, 
the Sixth Circuit upheld the law18 while the Eighth Circuit initially in-
validated the buffer zone.19
This Comment argues that the Eighth Circuit was right to grant a 
rehearing because its initial decision was incorrect.
  At the time of this writing, the Eighth 
Circuit has vacated its opinion and will rehear the case en banc.   
20  The statutes at 
issue in these cases, like Maryland’s new statute, are constitutional be-
cause they are content-neutral laws that are narrowly tailored to serve 
the important governmental interest of protecting mourners’ privacy 
at funerals, and allow picketers ample alternative communicative 
channels.21  Reasonable time, place, or manner regulations22 of this 
nature do not infringe on picketers’ First Amendment rights.23  Ra-
ther, they are valid measures designed to protect the privacy of vul-
nerable mourners who may be otherwise held captive to unwanted 
speech at funerals.24
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
Freedom of speech enjoys a historic pedigree in the United 
States.25
 
 18. Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 373 (6th Cir. 2008). 
  The most important legal manifestation of American socie-
ty’s commitment to free speech can be found in the First Amendment 
 19. Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 658 F.3d 813, 816–17 (8th Cir. 2011), vacated, 
reh’g en banc granted (Dec. 7, 2011). 
 20. See infra text accompanying note 171. 
 21. See infra Part II.B. 
 22. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 23. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 24. See infra Part II.B. 
 25. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1969) (arguing 
that the Framers and ratifiers of the First Amendment “intended to wipe out the common 
law of sedition, and make further prosecutions for criticism of the government, without 
any incitement to law-breaking, forever impossible in the United States of America”).  But 
see LEONARD WILLIAMS LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN 
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY, at vii–viii (1960) (contending the framing generation believed 
in a narrower scope for freedom of expression than Chafee suggested, and that broad li-
bertarian theories of the First Amendment were not commonly advanced until after 1798, 
when the Jeffersonians used them to politically oppose the speech-restrictive Alien and 
Sedition Acts of the Adams Administration). For an intellectual history of the American 
Revolution that documents the rise of radical libertarian thought in late colonial America, 
see generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1967).  
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to the Constitution, which guarantees that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”26  Near-
ly a century ago, the Supreme Court incorporated this key protection 
against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.27
This Part begins with a brief introduction to First Amendment 
theory and principles.
  Thus, the First Amendment protects an individual’s 
right to freedom of expression from infringements posed by both the 
federal government and the states. 
28  Next, it surveys some constitutional limits on 
a state’s ability to impose criminal and civil liability for speech-based 
crimes and torts, focusing on the Court’s most recent landmark First 
Amendment case, Snyder v. Phelps.29  This is followed by a discussion of 
constitutional limits on a state’s power to enact content-neutral sta-
tutes that impose incidental burdens on speech.30  Particular atten-
tion in this discussion is given to Maryland’s statute regulating picket-
ing near funerals, as well as cases analyzing similar statutes.31
A.  First Amendment Theory and Principles 
   
Leading legal scholars agree that the First Amendment’s free 
speech clause serves several essential functions in American society.32  
First, freedom of speech advances personal fulfillment by allowing 
people to realize their individual potential through the expression of 
their personal thoughts and ideas free from coercion.33  Second, the 
right to free speech facilitates the discovery of truth by allowing 
people to test competing viewpoints against one another in the mar-
ketplace of ideas.34  Third, freedom of expression promotes public 
participation and engagement with important political, social, and 
cultural decisions.35
 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
  Fourth, freedom of speech contributes to a stable 
and flexible society by elevating reason and persuasion above force 
 27. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[W]e may and do assume that 
freedom of speech and of the press . . . are among the fundamental personal rights and 
‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from im-
pairment by the States.”). 
 28. See infra Part I.A. 
 29. See infra Part I.B. 
 30. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 31. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 32. See, e.g., THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970) 
(explaining the values and functions of freedom of expression). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 7. 
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and suppression.36  Philosophical justifications for free speech often 
explicitly or implicitly underlie Supreme Court interpretations of the 
First Amendment.37
B.  First Amendment Limits to Content-Based Restrictions on Speech 
  Indeed, these fundamental principles are care-
fully interwoven into the Court’s modern First Amendment jurispru-
dence. 
Perhaps the most fundamental way the First Amendment secures 
the essential values of freedom of expression is by placing constitu-
tional limits on a state’s power to impose liability based on the con-
tent of speech.  This is accomplished principally through two mechan-
isms.  First, the First Amendment constitutionally checks a state’s 
authority to criminally punish speech by serving as a defense in crimi-
nal cases in which the proscribed actus reus consists of the expression 
of particular ideas or sentiments.38  Second, the First Amendment 
serves as a defense in civil trials in which the cause of action is based 
on allegedly tortious speech.39
1.  The First Amendment as a Shield in Criminal Prosecutions 
   
Despite the central value that was placed on the ideal of individ-
ual liberty in America’s early history,40 the Supreme Court did not sus-
tain any challenges to the First Amendment until the twentieth cen-
tury.  Early case law focused on the extent to which the government 
could criminally punish seditious speech.41
 
 36. Id.  For other influential works defending free speech, see generally JOHN STUART 
MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) (defending freedom of speech on utilitarian grounds) and JOHN 
MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644) (arguing against government censorship). 
  These cases arose during 
World War I and addressed the constitutionality of laws drafted to 
suppress various types of speech that legislatures regarded as danger-
 37. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make 
men free . . . .  They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.”).  Justice Brandeis’s 
famous concurring opinion echoed philosophical arguments for freedom of expression 
based on the self-fulfillment and autonomy of the individual.  Id. 
 38. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 39. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 40. See BAILYN, supra note 25, at 232 (highlighting the “infectious . . . spirit” and “intel-
lectual dynamism” of libertarian idealism that existed on the eve of American indepen-
dence). 
 41. Seditious libel is speech that criticizes the government.  See, e.g., Schenck v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52–53 (1919) (upholding defendant’s conviction under the Espionage 
Act of 1917 on the grounds that defendant’s criticism of military conscription created a 
“clear and present danger” of causing “substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent”). 
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ous or seditious.42  In Brandenburg v. Ohio,43 the Supreme Court an-
nounced the modern rule that the government may not punish 
speech unless that speech is (1) directed at inciting imminent lawless 
action and (2) is likely to incite such action.44  Brandenburg and its 
progeny effectively guard unpopular, controversial speech—even 
“hate speech”—from state suppression.45  Although the Court initially 
recognized a few exceptions to this speech-protective rule, such as the 
state’s power to criminalize the utterance of “fighting words,”46 later 
precedent has narrowed these doctrinal exceptions.47
2.  The First Amendment as a Shield in Civil Lawsuits 
  
If the reason for strict First Amendment limits on criminal pu-
nishment of speech is to preserve free and open debate, then this 
same reason militates in favor of limiting a state’s power to allow civil 
damages for speech as well.48  While perhaps not as severe as criminal 
punishment, the apprehension of private lawsuits can also deter citi-
zens from expressing their views.49  Therefore, in addition to shiel-
ding individuals from criminal punishment, the First Amendment al-
so restrains the state power to permit civil damages based on tortious 
speech.50
 
 42. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 357 (communist speech); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652 (1925) (socialist speech); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (anti-war 
speech). 
 
 43. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 44. Id. at 447. 
 45. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (invalidating ordinance 
which criminalized invective based on “race, color, creed, religion, or gender”). 
 46. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (holding that the state 
may prohibit the utterance of words that “men of common intelligence would understand 
[to be] likely to cause an average addressee to fight”). 
 47. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 114 
(1980) (concluding that since Chaplinsky the “fighting words” doctrine had been so greatly 
narrowed by later cases that it “was no longer to be understood as a euphemism for con-
troversial or dirty talk but was to require instead a quite unambiguous invitation to a 
brawl”). 
 48. E.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (underscoring the United 
States’ “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”). 
 49. See id. at 300–01 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting the “chilling effect” of state 
libel law on speech). 
 50. See id. at 283 (majority opinion) (“We hold today that the Constitution delimits a 
State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against crit-
ics of their official conduct.”). 
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a.  The First Amendment as Defense to a Libel Action 
Libel is a paradigmatic example of a private cause of action that 
brings into sharp relief the conflict between the individual’s freedom 
of speech and the State’s interest in redressing private wrongs.  In New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court held that when a public figure 
sues for defamation or libel, the First Amendment requires that she 
prove actual malice in order to recover damages.51  A decade later, 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. narrowed the scope of this rule when it is a 
non-public figure who files a defamation or libel suit.52  In Gertz, the 
Court held that the First Amendment forbids states from imposing 
liability without fault with respect to such defamation claims,53 but 
that states may otherwise define for themselves the proper standard of 
liability for the defamation of private individuals.54  The Court’s rea-
soning was premised on maintaining an “equitable boundary” be-
tween the competing values of free speech and the state’s interest in 
protecting its private citizens from reputational injury.55  Taken to-
gether, Sullivan and Gertz collectively stand for the proposition that 
the First Amendment requires a robust “actual malice” rule when pub-
lic figures seek to recover defamation damages, but a less strenuous 
liability rule when private figures sue.56
In addition to the public figure versus private figure distinction, 
the Court has also distinguished between speech that relates to purely 
private matters and speech that relates to public issues.  The latter en-
joys far more rigorous First Amendment protections.
 
57
 
 51. Id. at 279–80.  The Court defined “actual malice” as (1) knowledge that the state-
ments made are false, or (2) reckless disregard as to whether the statements made are true 
or false.  Id. at 280. 
  
 52. 418 U.S. 323, 340–42 (1974). 
 53. Consistent with First Amendment principles of free speech, the Court reasoned 
that “a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accu-
racy of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship.”  Id. at 340. 
 54. Id. at 347. 
 55. Id. at 347–48. 
 56. Compare Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (requiring actual malice before finding liabili-
ty for defamation or libel of public figures), with Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (forbidding a strict 
liability standard when hearing defamation or libel claims). 
 57. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“[S]peech on public issues 
occupies the ‘highest rung of the heirarchy [sic] of First Amendment values,’ and is en-
titled to special protection.” (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 
913 (1982); Carry v. Brown 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755–61 (1985) (noting that First Amendment protec-
tions are less stringent when the speech involved relates to matters of purely private con-
cern).  
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b.   Snyder v. Phelps: First Amendment as Defense to the 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Tort Action 
The intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) tort is al-
so limited by the First Amendment.58  For the past several decades, 
the leading case on this question has been Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell.59  In Hustler, Hustler magazine published a parody advertise-
ment attacking noted televangelist Jerry Falwell by implying that he 
lost his virginity to his mother in an outhouse.60  The Court held that 
when a public figure or public official brings an IIED claim based on 
speech, the First Amendment limits a state’s power to award damag-
es.61  Just as with libel and defamation claims, the plaintiff must prove 
“actual malice” on the part of the defendant before she may recover 
damages.62  The Court based part of its analysis on the fact that Fal-
well was a public figure, reasoning that protecting criticism of public 
figures was “necessary to give adequate ‘breathing space’ to the free-
doms protected by the First Amendment.”63
Speech directed to private figures recently received similar pro-
tection in Snyder v. Phelps, where the Court acknowledged that the 
First Amendment shielded a defendant from paying monetary dam-
ages for the emotional distress allegedly caused by his speech.
   
64  The 
defendant in Snyder v. Phelps, Fred Phelps, believes that the United 
States is evil and worthy of God’s wrath because of, among other is-
sues, its toleration of homosexuality, particularly in the military.65  
Phelps and the congregants of his church—the Westboro Baptist 
Church66
 
 58. In order to recover for damages under the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress (“IIED”) in Maryland, the plaintiff must prove that defendant “intentionally 
or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that caused the plaintiff to suf-
fer severe emotional distress.”  Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (citing Har-
ris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614, 281 Md. 560, 565–66 (1977)). 
—targeted the funeral of Matthew Snyder, a Marine Lance 
 59. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).  See also W. Wat Hopkin, Snyder v. Phelps, Private Persons and 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Chance for the Supreme Court to Set Things Right, 9 
FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 149, 163–75 (2010) (discussing the significance of Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc. v. Falwell).  
 60. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 48.  See also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL (special ed. 1991) (1988) (detailing the history of Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, up to and including the parties’ oral arguments).   
 61. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56. 
 62. Id.   
 63. Id. at 56–57.   
 64. 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220–21 (2011). 
 65. Id. at 1213.  Phelps also opposes the Catholic Church.  Id. at 1217. 
 66. Fred Phelps established the Westboro Baptist Church in 1955.  Id. at 1212.  Most of 
the church’s congregants are Phelps’s own relatives.  Hagerty, supra note 5.  They regularly 
picket military funerals in order to express their view that God hates America because of 
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Corporal who was killed in the line of duty in Iraq.67  On the day of 
Corporal Snyder’s funeral in Westminster, Maryland, the congregants 
picketed on public land approximately 1,000 feet from the funeral 
site for about thirty minutes before the start of the ceremony.68  They 
carried placards stating “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Priests Rape 
Boys,” and “God Hates Fags.”69  The protesters did not enter the 
property on which the funeral was held or otherwise disrupt the buri-
al service, but Corporal Snyder’s father learned of the protest later 
that evening while watching a news report and experienced great 
emotional anguish as a result.70
The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protected 
Phelps against tort liability.
  
71  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
Roberts evaluated the circumstances of the protest to determine 
whether protesters’ speech concerned matters of “public concern.”72
 
its tolerance of homosexuality in the military.  The church has picketed hundreds of U.S. 
military funerals over several decades.  Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1212.   
  
Finding that the protesters expressed views on social and political is-
sues of interest to the general public, the Court concluded that the 
 67. Id. at 1212.  Mathew Snyder was also a Catholic.  Id. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 68. Id. at 1213 (majority opinion). 
 69. Id.  Other signs included “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “Pope in 
Hell,” “God Hates You,” “America is Doomed,” and “You’re Going to Hell.”  Id. 
 70. Id. at 1213–14.  Corporal Snyder’s father thereafter sued Phelps and his daughters 
in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy.  Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. 
Supp. 2d 567, 597 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 
(2011).  The ensuing trial concluded with the jury awarding Snyder $2.9 million in com-
pensatory damages for the emotional distress inflicted upon him by the Phelpses.  Id.  The 
jury also awarded Snyder $8 million in punitive damages, but the District Court remitted 
this to $2.1 million.  Id.  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed.  580 F.3d 206, 221 (4th Cir. 2009).  The Fourth Circuit agreed with Phelps 
that his speech was “fully protected” by the First Amendment, and that he was therefore 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 222–24. 
 71. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216.  Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion that empha-
sized the fact-intensive nature and narrow quality of the holding.  Id. at 1221 (Breyer, J., 
concurring).  He opined that First Amendment analysis generally cannot end with the ma-
jority’s inquiry into whether defendant’s speech related to “matters of ‘public concern.’”  
Id.  Rather, Justice Breyer’s preferred approach balances key “First Amendment values” 
against “state-protected . . . interests” whenever the two conflict.  Id.  Although more sym-
pathetic to Snyder’s argument than the majority, Justice Breyer ultimately agreed that the 
First Amendment barred recovery under the specific facts of this case.  Id. at 1221–22.  
Since neither Snyder nor any other funeral attendee could see the signs from the funeral, 
Justice Breyer concluded that upholding the application of Maryland’s tort law would re-
strict public speech and would fail to “proportionately” further Maryland’s interest in pro-
tecting its citizens.  Id.  
 72. Id. at 1215 (majority opinion).   
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protesters’ speech was entitled to “special” First Amendment protec-
tion and barred Snyder from recovery.73
The Court found that Phelps’s signs, however crude in their 
manner of expression, nevertheless discussed political and moral is-
sues of national importance, such as clerical scandals and government 
policy relating to homosexuality in the military.
   
74  Since these state-
ments communicated Phelps’s position on these issues to a public au-
dience, the statements plainly related to matters of public concern.75  
The Court rejected Snyder’s argument that Phelps was invoking the 
First Amendment as a mere pretext to insulate a personal attack from 
liability.76  Indeed, Phelps’s long history of similar protests and well-
documented views on homosexuality and the military belied the no-
tion that his speech was primarily motivated by a personal animus 
against Snyder.77  The Court especially emphasized that mere “outra-
geousness” (the appropriate standard for IIED claims)78 is a constitu-
tionally impermissible standard for First Amendment claims because 
it is too subjective and gives jurors the discretion to punish unpopular 
expression.79
In dissent, Justice Alito characterized Phelps’s protest as a brutal, 
personal attack on Snyder, a private figure, that made “no contribu-
tion to public debate.”
   
80
 
 73. Id. at 1216.  The Court began its analysis with an examination of the content and 
context of the protesters’ speech.  This speech primarily consisted of placards with state-
ments such as “Priests Rape Boys” and “Fags Doom Nations.”  Id. at 1216–17. 
  Justice Alito analogized Phelps to an assai-
lant who physically attacks a random victim, knowing that his assault 
 74. Id. at 1217. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  The majority opinion also argued that the form of Phelps’s speech did not 
convert it into private speech.  Even though Phelps admittedly used Snyder’s funeral as a 
platform to garner publicity, his choice of location bore a strong relation to his public 
views.  Since “Westboro believes that God is killing American soldiers as punishment for 
the Nation’s sinful policies,” it made logical sense for the church to voice these views at a 
military funeral.  Id. 
 78. See id. at 1215 (citing Harris v. Jones, 380 A2d 611, 614, 281 Md. 560, 565–66 
(1977)) (affirming that plaintiffs in Maryland IIED cases must prove that the defendant 
“intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that caused the 
plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress”). 
 79. Id. at 1219.  The Court also affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s reversal on the torts of 
seclusion and civil conspiracy.  The majority opinion reasoned that its “captive audience” 
doctrine, a narrow exception designed to protect especially vulnerable listeners, could not 
be extended to the circumstances of this case—Snyder was not a “captive” to the unwanted 
speech because Phelps did not actually disrupt his son’s funeral.  Id. at 1220.  Thus, Snyder 
could not establish that his “substantial privacy interests” were invaded in an “essentially 
intolerable manner.”  Id.  (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
 80. Id. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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will be covered by the news, as a deliberate strategy to amplify his 
message to the public.81  Just as the Court would not find an assai-
lant’s attack to be constitutionally protected, Justice Alito argued, nei-
ther should it have protected Phelps’s verbal assault by confusing 
Phelps’s views with his tortious means of attracting publicity for those 
views.82
Also, Justice Alito forcefully critiqued the Court’s “public issues” 
rationale for protecting Phelps’s speech.  Arguing that the Court in-
accurately classified the funeral protest, Justice Alito considered 
Phelps’s speech predominantly personal rather than ideological in 
nature.
 
83  Unmoved by the fact that the protest occurred on a public 
street, the dissent argued that just as an assault can occur on public 
land, so too can IIED.84
C.  First Amendment Limits to Content-Neutral Regulations 
 
Besides offering powerful defenses against speech-based criminal 
and civil liability,85 the First Amendment also delimits a state’s author-
ity to enact content-neutral speech regulations.86  A number of states, 
including Maryland, have used content-neutral “buffer zone” laws to 
regulate picketing at or near funeral services.87
1.  Content-Neutral Regulations Generally 
 
States sometimes enact laws that do not aim to suppress particu-
lar ideas but nonetheless place incidental burdens on freedom of ex-
 
 81. Id. at 1226.  In such a case, the dissent continued, it is important to distinguish be-
tween the means of the tortfeasor’s act (the assault) and his end (the speech); only the lat-
ter is constitutionally protected.  Id. at 1226–27.  The failure to make this distinction con-
flates means with ends, and this Justice Alito contended was the majority’s grave error.  Id. 
at 1226. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1227. Furthermore, even assuming that the picketers mixed some ideological 
speech into their personal attack of Matthew Snyder, Justice Alito criticized the Court’s 
implicit assumption that actionable speech should be protected simply by virtue of its 
commingling with protected speech. Id. at 1226–27.  He contended that Phelps’s lack of a 
personal grudge against Snyder was legally insignificant; if anything, it would make Phelps 
even more blameworthy, not less, that he used a “cold and calculated strategy to slash a 
stranger as a means of attracting public attention.”  Id. at 1227. 
 84. Id.  
 85. See supra Part I.B. 
 86. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 87. See infra Part I.C.2. 
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pression.88  Such laws are said to be content-neutral because they re-
gulate the time, place, or manner in which ideas and views may be 
expressed but do not discriminate against speech based on its subs-
tantive content.89  When a content-neutral law (unrelated to the sup-
pression of a particular viewpoint) imposes burdens on speech in 
public fora, the Court has held that the law must be narrowly tailored 
to serve an important state interest and must leave the speaker with 
ample alternative channels of communication.90
Under this First Amendment rule, some kinds of expressive con-
duct may be forbidden entirely.  For instance, in United States v. 
O’Brien, the Court upheld the conviction under the Selective Service 
Act of a man who had burned his draft card in protest of the Vietnam 
War.
   
91  The Court held that the Selective Service Act was justified by 
Congress’s constitutional power to maintain an effective military and 
that the Act was narrowly tailored to further that end.92  Similarly, the 
Court in Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent 
upheld a city ordinance that prohibited posting signs (including polit-
ical signs) on public property.93  The Court recognized that advancing 
aesthetic values by preventing the unsightly littering of signs was a le-
gitimate governmental interest.94  Because the ordinance did not im-
pact individuals’ rights to speak or hand out literature, it left open 
ample means of alternative communication.95
 
 88. E.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (upholding municipal au-
thority to “control the use of its public streets for parades or processions” by regulating the 
“time, place, and manner” in which such processions may be conducted).   
 
 89. See e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that time, 
place, and manner regulations must not regulate the content of the speech). 
 90. See id. (“[T]he government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, 
or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference 
to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communi-
cation of the information.’”(quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 
288, 293 (1984))). 
 91. 391 U.S. 367, 396, 386 (1968).  
 92. Id. at 381–82.  The Court rejected O’Brien’s argument that Congress enacted the 
provision against burning draft cards with the legislative intent to stifle anti-war protest 
speech, relying upon the “familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not 
strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative 
motive.”  Id. at 382–83. 
 93. 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984). 
 94. Id. at 816–17. 
 95. Id. at 812. 
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2.  Picketing Regulations  
Some states have enacted laws to regulate picketing activity with-
in a certain time and distance of funerals.  Maryland’s funeral picket-
ing statute states in pertinent part: “A person may not engage in pick-
eting activity within 500 feet of a funeral, burial, memorial service, or 
funeral procession that is targeted at one or more persons attending 
the funeral, burial, memorial service, or funeral procession.”96  Other 
states have enacted similar statutes.97
In Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld Ohio’s funeral protest law as a content-neutral measure nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant state interest in protecting mourn-
ers’ privacy while leaving ample alternative means of speech for prote-
sters.
  While the Supreme Court has 
not yet ruled on the constitutionality of any of these laws, two United 
States Courts of Appeals have done so. 
98   The Ohio statute created a 300-foot buffer zone during, as 
well as one hour before and after the funeral.99  The court relied on a 
Supreme Court decision upholding state bans on residential picket-
ing100 and protesting near medical centers where abortions were per-
formed.101  These cases relied on the theory that certain audiences—
for example, private residents in their homes or abortion patients en-
tering clinics—are “captive” to unwanted speech by virtue of their 
unique inability to avoid the speech.102  In select circumstances, the 
Court has held that the vulnerability of these “captive audiences” gives 
rise to a governmental interest that is sufficiently strong to protect 
them from unwanted speech with regulations.103
 
 96. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2011). 
  The Sixth Circuit 
extended the “captive audience” doctrine to funeral attendees, rea-
soning by analogy that mourners are just as emotionally vulnerable as 
 97. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-125 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (setting a buf-
fer zone of 100 feet from a funeral); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.055 (West 2006 & Supp. 
2011) (establishing a buffer zone of 300 feet between protesters and funerals). 
 98. 539 F.3d 356, 373 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 99. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2011).  
 100. Strickland, 539 F.3d. at 363 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476 (1988)).  
 101. See id. (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715–18 (2000); Madsen v. Women’s 
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994)).  These cases recognized an important state 
interest in protecting the medical privacy of abortion patients who were “captive” to un-
wanted speech near medical facilities due to their “medical circumstance.”  Id.  
 102. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487 (“The First Amendment permits the government to 
prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the ‘captive’ audience cannot avoid the objec-
tionable speech.” (citing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
530, 542 (1980)). 
 103. Id. 
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abortion patients and just as unable to avoid unwanted speech as pri-
vate residents.104
By contrast, in Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, the Eighth Circuit 
struck down a similar funeral protest ordinance under the First 
Amendment, finding that the ordinance did not serve any significant 
government interest.
 
105  Exactly as in Strickland, the ordinance at issue 
banned picketing within 300 feet of funeral site during, as well as 
within one hour before or after the funeral service.106  Acknowledging 
its sister circuit’s contrary opinion in Strickland, the court’s brief opi-
nion nonetheless declined to recognize a significant state interest in 
sheltering funeral attendees from unwanted speech.107  Subsequently, 
however the Eighth Circuit vacated its decision and granted a rehear-
ing of the case en banc.108
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
There are two different methods states might use to address the 
type of funeral picketing that occurred in Snyder v. Phelps.  The first 
method is reactive: the state can simply wait for private individuals 
harmed by picketers to bring civil actions against the alleged wrong-
doers and let judges and juries sort out the claims.109  This first me-
thod of restricting funeral picketing has been rightfully limited by the 
Supreme Court, as the power of judges and juries to impose speech 
deterrents violates the spirit and evolution of First Amendment doc-
trine.110  The second method is proactive: the state legislature can 
enact laws restricting picketing activities within a certain timeframe or 
geographical radius from funeral ceremonies.111  This latter method, 
which includes Maryland’s current approach, strikes an appropriate 
balance between the privacy concerns of funeral attendees and the 
fundamental freedoms of the First Amendment.112
 
 104. Strickland, 539 F.3d at 366. 
 
 105. 658 F.3d 813, 816–17 (8th Cir. 2011), vacated, reh’g en banc granted (Dec. 7, 2011). 
 106. Id. at 815. 
 107. See id. at 816–17 (finding that protection for unwilling listeners does not extend 
outside the home). 
 108. Id. at 814.  As of the time of this writing, the rehearing has not been held. 
 109. See infra Part II.A. 
 110. See infra Part II.A. 
 111. See infra Part II.B. 
 112. See infra Part II.B. 
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A.  The Supreme Court Correctly Barred Private Litigation as a Means of 
Deterring Invasive Speech at Funerals 
Maryland followed the first method of dealing with picketing at 
funerals in Snyder v. Phelps—that is, waiting for funeral mourners to 
sue picketers.113  This policy, however, has been foreclosed, or at least 
substantially limited,114 by the Court’s decision in Snyder, which 
shielded Phelps from having to pay monetary damages for his “outra-
geous” speech.115  This section argues that the Court reached the cor-
rect result.116  Although Snyder extended First Amendment protec-
tions further than the Court’s holding in Hustler by immunizing 
speech targeted against private (as opposed to only public) figures,117 
the underlying rationale behind Hustler supported such an exten-
sion.118  Allowing juries to award damages based on the perceived 
“outrageousness” of speech, even when directed to purely private fig-
ures, would confer juries with an arbitrary and censorial power that is 
unacceptable in light of fundamental First Amendment values.119
1.  The Court Properly Extended First Amendment Protections to 
Speech Directed to Private Figures in IIED Cases When the Speech 
at Issue Relates to Issues of Public Concern 
 
In essence, the Court’s decision in Snyder can be cast as a 
straightforward syllogism of law and fact.  The first premise is that the 
First Amendment may be raised as a defense in a state tort suit if the 
defendant’s allegedly tortious speech relates to “public issues.”120  The 
second premise is that speech is considered to relate to public issues if 
it can “be fairly considered” to relate to matters of concern to the 
community, such as debated social or political issues.121
 
 113. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
  The third 
 114. According to Justice Breyer’s reading of the Court’s opinion, the Court balanced 
Phelps’s First Amendment right against Maryland’s interest in enforcing IIED claims, and 
grounded its decision in light of the specific facts of the case, namely, that the picketers 
had complied with police directions and could not be observed from the funeral.  Snyder 
v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1221–22 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).  If Justice Breyer’s read-
ing is an accurate description of the Court’s holding, then a state may arguably enforce 
IIED claims against funeral picketers in the future, consistent with Snyder, if the picketers 
are visible or audible to the funeral attendees.   
 115. See supra Part I.B.2.b.  
 116. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 117. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 118. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 119. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 120. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (stating that speech relating to 
public issues is entitled to special First Amendment protection). 
 121. Id. at 1216 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).  
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premise is that Phelps’s speech plainly related to matters of political 
and social concern to the community.122
While this argument is persuasive with respect to speech directed 
to public figures, some have argued that the First Amendment should 
not offer similar immunity to speech attacking private persons.
  From these well-established 
premises, it follows that Phelps’s speech was of public concern and 
therefore merited special First Amendment protection which shielded 
it against Snyder’s suit. 
123  Ac-
cording to this line of reasoning, protecting criticism of public figures 
serves essential First Amendment values, but protecting hateful 
speech directed to private individuals does not.124  These critics argue 
that, just as it did in Gertz, the Court should have distinguished be-
tween public and private figures, rigorously protecting only speech re-
lated to the former type.125  In other words, in the context of IIED 
claims, Snyder should have been to Hustler what Gertz was to Sullivan in 
the context of defamation claims.126
This argument, however, is ultimately incongruent with the 
Court’s overall First Amendment jurisprudence because “[s]peech 
about private figures is generally constitutionally protected.”
   
127
 
 122. Id. at 1217.  As the Court emphasized, the speech expressed in the Westboro Bapt-
ist Church’s signs, despite their vulgar manner of expression, clearly related to debated 
social issues such as “the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, 
the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic 
clergy.”  Id.  
  Al-
though critics might cite Gertz as one example of a case where speech 
about a private figure was not constitutionally protected, Gertz is not 
apposite because it involved a defamatory statement of fact—the false 
 123. See, e.g., Jeffrey Shulman, The Outrageous God: Emotional Distress, Tort Liability, and the 
Limits of Religious Advocacy, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 381, 403 (2008) (“When religious advoca-
cy is used to attack private individuals, assuredly the principle of voluntariness offers no 
basis for immunity from civil redress.” (footnote omitted)). 
 124. As Justice Alito argued in dissent, “commentary on the Catholic Church or the 
United States military constitutes speech on matters of public concern, [but] speech re-
garding Matthew Snyder’s purely private conduct does not.”  Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1226 (Ali-
to, J., dissenting).  Justice Alito likened Westboro’s conduct to that of a “private feud” and 
would have held that the First Amendment “permits a private figure to recover for the in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress caused by speech on a matter of private concern.”  
Id. at 1227–28.   
 125. According to this view, permitting state tort law to operate more freely in the realm 
of private speech is an equitable way to balance the privacy interests of some citizens 
against the free speech right of other citizens.  See id. at 1215–16 (majority opinion) (ex-
plaining that speech involving private matters does not hinder debate or meaningful di-
alogue on public issues).   
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 51–56. 
 127. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300, 304. 
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accusation that Gertz was a Communist conspirator—in contradistinc-
tion to an idea or opinion—such as the immorality of homosexuality.128  
Because “there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact,” 
the speech in Gertz was not entitled to special constitutional protec-
tion.129  By contrast, Phelps’s speech consisted of ideas and opinions 
on matters of public concern, which are entitled to special constitu-
tional protection under the First Amendment.130  As the Court in Gertz 
itself affirmed, “[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing 
as a false idea.”131
Indeed, Professor Eugene Volokh has noted a related difficulty 
with allowing juries in IIED cases to decide on a case-by-case basis 
when speech—even speech about private figures—is too “outra-
geous.”
  Thus, it would have been improper to decline to 
protect Phelps’s ideological and religious speech simply because it was 
directed at a private figure. 
132  As Professor Volokh argues, the category of private figures 
includes many people who are deeply immersed in public matters.133  
Authors, professors, and criminals, for instance, may not be public 
figures, but may nevertheless be intimately involved in important pub-
lic issues.134  Accordingly, even though eliminating First Amendment 
barriers to private IIED lawsuits might not necessarily result in a proli-
feration of IIED litigation, the potential threat of such lawsuits could 
easily exert a chilling influence on public debate by deterring indi-
viduals from taking controversial positions on important issues.135
 
 128. Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 326 (1974) (describing labeling 
Gertz as a Communist as a false statement of fact), with Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (describ-
ing Westboro’s speech as ideas). 
  
Moreover, requiring jurors to decide which speech is too “outra-
 129. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340. 
 130. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219.  It might well be the case that certain parts of Westboro’s 
speech were not opinions or ideas, but rather, were false and malicious statements of fact 
about private individuals.  For example, on its website, Westboro denounced the Snyder 
family.  While a colorable argument may be made that these statements should be inter-
preted as false statements of fact and not hyperbole, the Court ultimately declined to con-
sider these statements in its opinion because Snyder did not raise them in his petition for 
certiorari.  Id. at 1214 n.1.   
 131. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339. 
 132. See Volokh, supra note 127, at 309 (criticizing reliance on IIED action as a way to 
regulate speech because it is a “vague law [that] impermissibly delegates basic policy mat-
ters to . . . ‘juries for resolution on an ad hoc basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary 
and discriminatory application.’” (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 
(1972))). 
 133. Id. at 305. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 302 (arguing that “the vagueness of the ‘outrageousness’ standard [which 
is the standard for IIED claims] exacerbates the risk that the emotional distress tort will 
deter . . . speech”). 
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geous” is to effectively imbue juries with censorial power, a result in-
compatible with fundamental First Amendment principles.136
2.   Justice Alito’s Dissenting Opinion Failed to Establish Why 
Phelps’s Speech Was Undeserving of First Amendment Protections 
   
Because the Court rightly extended First Amendment protec-
tions to speech directed to private plaintiffs in IIED cases when the 
speech at issue relates to public concerns, its decision in Snyder should 
be applauded.  Justice Alito’s sole dissent is worthy of consideration 
but is ultimately unpersuasive.  According to Justice Alito’s most com-
pelling argument, Phelps is like someone who physically assaults a vic-
tim in order to generate news coverage of his views.137  While the subs-
tantive content of such an assailant’s speech would be fully protected, 
his unlawful means of obtaining a channel of communication for that 
speech—that is, his assault—would not enjoy similar immunity from 
civil or criminal liability.138  Likewise, while Fred Phelps should be 
generally free to write and speak as he pleases under the First 
Amendment, he should not be afforded the judicial privilege of in-
flicting gratuitous harm on grieving family members with impunity 
just so that he can gain a special platform through which to express 
his views.139
At first glance, this argument seems plausible.  It is admittedly 
likely that the only reason Phelps selects military funerals as the stage 
of choice for picketing is because he expects that such a controversial 
venue will generate the most publicity for his church’s extreme 
views.
 
140
No one doubts that constitutional protections for free speech do 
not extend to assaults or other wrongful acts, even when those acts 
  Upon closer analysis, however, Justice Alito’s analogy is 
flawed. 
 
 136. Id. at 308.  As Professor Volokh argues, “Even if a First Amendment specialist, 
steeped in the First Amendment insistence on viewpoint neutrality, might set aside the 
viewpoint of speech in deciding whether the speech is outrageous, there’s no reason to be 
confident that a lay juror will do the same.”  Id.  Indeed, jurors are instructed to consider 
“all the factors that can make speech outrageous,” and many jurors will presumably interp-
ret this to include the substantive content of the speech.  Id. 
 137. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1226 (2011) (Alito, J, dissenting). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Cf. Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 372 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[Phelps-Roper] 
openly admits . . . that a ‘funeral is the occasion of her speech, not its audience.’”). 
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may be undertaken with an expressive purpose.141  The hypothetical 
assailant in Justice Alito’s example, however, commits two unique acts: 
first, the assault; then, the speech.142  These two discrete acts are easily 
distinguished from one another both in terms of their purpose143 and 
their timing.144  By contrast, the elements that constitute Phelps’s ver-
bal “assault”—“outrageous” statements such as “God hates fags”—are 
exactly identical to his speech.145  Therefore, unlike the assailant in Jus-
tice Alito’s analogy, one cannot disentangle Phelps’s “assault” from 
his constitutionally protected speech.146
In the case of the hypothetical assailant, the government logically 
can punish the wrongful assault without implicating First Amendment 
concerns, as long as it confines itself to punishing only the wrongful 
assault and not the speech that follows it.
 
147  By contrast, the emotion-
al harm which Snyder sought to remedy in Snyder v. Phelps was directly 
created by Phelps’s speech itself, not some other wrongful act that was 
purely a means to advance his speech.148
 
 141. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (“[A] physical assault is not 
by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.” 
(citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984))).    
  The government may not 
impose liability for such a verbal “assault” consistent with the First 
Amendment; any such liability would by definition curtail free speech. 
 142. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1226 (Alito, J, dissenting) (discussing both the assault and 
the opportunity it provides). 
 143. The unlawful assault is not itself the message, but rather, is merely a means to the 
end of transmitting the message to the public.  
 144. The assault occurs prior to the speech.     
 145. Evidence during the trial, including expert testimony, established that the mental 
association between his dead son and Westboro’s picketing caused Snyder to experience 
emotional anguish and severe depression.  Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214 (majority opinion). 
 146. Of course, one might argue that the content of Phelps’s speech remains distinct 
from its venue and timing, and that courts should therefore be permitted to instruct juries 
that they are to award damages only for the tortious manner in which speech is expressed 
without regard to content.  Even if this may be possible in theory, however, there is good 
reason to be skeptical about the ability of courts to apply such fine distinctions in practice.  
Rather, juries faced with deciding whether the expression of provocative and emotionally 
charged speech is “extreme and outrageous” are likely to be highly influenced by the con-
tent of that speech in making their determination.  See Volokh, supra note 127, at 307–09 
(expressing doubt that the jury, without any consideration of the reviling content of 
Phelps’s speech, sincerely concluded that Snyder was “damaged to the tune of $2.9 million 
by speech (1) that he saw once . . . on television, (2) that he knew was not remotely reflec-
tive of the views of his community, and (3) that he knew was said by people who are held 
in contempt by the community” (footnote omitted)). 
 147. E.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (explaining that conduct can-
not merely be protected as speech just because the person engaging in the conduct was 
expressing an idea). 
 148. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Maryland’s Funeral Picketing Statute Is Content-Neutral, Narrowly 
Tailored to Serve a Compelling State Interest, and Leaves Ample 
Alternative Means of Communication for Protesters 
The second method of dealing with intrusive picketing at funer-
als—special regulations targeted at funeral picketing—is currently in 
place in Maryland and other states that have passed “buffer zone” laws 
in the wake of Snyder v. Phelps.149  Although Snyder mentioned these 
laws in passing, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed their consti-
tutionality.150  This section argues that Maryland’s statute is a constitu-
tional time, place, and manner regulation because it is content-
neutral, narrowly tailored to serve an important governmental inter-
est, and allows for ample alternative channels of communication.151
Although the Supreme Court correctly determined that the type 
of IIED claims at issue in Snyder are constitutionally impermissible, 
this does not imply that mourners have no legal options against the 
invasive behavior of groups like Westboro.  Mourning the dead is a 
venerable and universal human practice, and mourners indeed de-
serve respectful privacy during their time of grieving.
 
152
The relevant statute creates a 500-foot buffer zone around every 
“funeral, burial, memorial service, or funeral procession.”
  Unlike the 
enforcement of IIED claims, which relies on the problematic standard 
of jury-determined “outrageousness,” Maryland’s law reflects a rea-
sonable effort to balance picketers’ right to free speech against the 
privacy interests of emotionally vulnerable mourners who are captive 
to unwanted speech at funerals. 
153
 
 149. See supra Part I.C.2. 
  Because 
this provision is content-neutral, it should be upheld as long as it 
serves an important governmental interest, is narrowly tailored to fur-
 150. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra note 90. 
 152. See Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free Speech Against 
the Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 MD. L. REV. 295, 297 (2008) (“The idea of paying 
respect to the dead is a concept as old as civilization itself.  Respecting the dead and a time 
of mourning is revered by the religious and the non-religious alike.  Some view respecting 
the dead and a time of mourning as a simple matter of human decency.” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
 153. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2011).  The statute 
also contains a provision making it unlawful to “address speech to a person attending a 
funeral, burial, memorial service, or funeral procession that is likely to incite or produce 
an imminent breach of the peace.”  Id. §10-205(B).  This Comment is concerned only with 
the “picketing” provision.  See id. §10-205(C) (“A person may not engage in picketing activ-
ity within 500 feet of a funeral, burial, memorial service, or funeral procession . . . .”). 
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ther that interest, and allows for alternative means of communica-
tion.154
1.  Maryland’s Picketing Statute Is Content-Neutral 
   
As a threshold matter, it should be noted that Maryland’s statute 
is content-neutral.  It does not, on its face, discriminate against cer-
tain types of speech on the basis of substantive content, but rather, 
proscribes picketing in general terms, irrespective of the viewpoint 
expressed.155  Given that Westboro is the only organization of note to 
protest at funerals, it is admittedly likely that the only, or at least the 
primary, reason for enacting this law was to curtail the Westboro’s fu-
neral picketing activity.156  However, legislative intent is unlikely to be 
a legally relevant consideration with respect to this issue.  The Su-
preme Court has held that it “will not strike down an otherwise consti-
tutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”157
2.  Maryland’s Picketing Statute Serves the Compelling State Interest 
of Protecting the Privacy of Captive Audiences 
  
Therefore, the statute is unlikely to be invalidated just because the 
Maryland legislature might have intended to stifle Fred Phelps with its 
passage.  Rather, since the statute is content-neutral, it may only be 
invalidated if it fails to satisfy the remaining three elements. 
In the exercise of their police powers, states have important in-
terests in protecting the privacy of vulnerable individuals who are cap-
tive to unwanted speech.158  As a general rule, it is true that a state 
may not shelter people from offensive or hurtful speech.159
 
 154. See supra Part I.C.1. 
  Those 
who find speech offensive typically must “avert their eyes” but are 
otherwise required under the First Amendment to tolerate their fel-
low citizens’ expression of beliefs, even when they regard those beliefs 
 155. See CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (c) (prohibiting “picketing activity”). 
 156. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Outrage at Funeral Protests Pushes Lawmakers to Act, N.Y. 
TIMES Apr. 17, 2006, at A14 (reporting state legislative reactions to the Westboro Baptist 
Church’s picketing activity). 
 157. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).  But see Church of Lukumi Ba-
balu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993) (stating the Court will consider a “city 
council’s object from both direct and circumstantial evidence” in evaluating the neutrality 
of a law and that relevant evidence includes “contemporaneous statements made by mem-
bers of the decisionmaking body”). 
 158. See supra text accompanying note 103. 
 159. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (opining that those who took 
offense to the defendant’s jacket—bearing the slogan “Fuck the Draft”—could “avoid fur-
ther bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes”). 
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as abhorrent.160  The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that a 
state has an interest in protecting certain vulnerable listeners from 
having their privacy invaded in an “essentially intolerable manner.”161  
The “captive audience” doctrine has led the Court to uphold bans on 
residential picketing as well as restrictions on picketing near medical 
facilities where abortions are performed.162
The Sixth Circuit logically extended the “captive audience” doc-
trine to funeral attendees, recognizing the truth that “individuals 
mourning the loss of a loved one share a privacy right similar to indi-
viduals in their homes or individuals entering a medical facility.”
 
163
[J]ust as a resident subjected to picketing is “left with no 
ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech,” mourners 
cannot easily avoid unwanted protests without sacrificing 
their right to partake in the funeral or burial service.  And 
just as “[p]ersons who [] attempt[] to enter health care facil-
ities . . . are often in particularly vulnerable physical and 
emotional conditions,” it goes without saying that funeral at-
tendees are also emotionally vulnerable.
  
The court continued: 
164
The Sixth Circuit’s synthesis of “captive audience” precedent apt-
ly identifies the criteria which the Supreme Court has historically 
concentrated on as being the most legally significant factors in de-
termining when an audience is “captive” to unwanted speech.  Specif-
ically, these criteria are (1) the audience’s inability to avoid the un-
wanted speech and (2) the audience’s condition of unique emotional 
or physical vulnerability.
 
165
Funeral mourners plainly fall into both categories.  It can scarce-
ly be doubted that mourners are in highly vulnerable emotional states 
during the burials of their loved ones.
 
166
 
 160. Id. at 20–21. 
  Furthermore, mourners 
cannot simply “avert their eyes” from the offending speech, because 
walking away from the picketers would mean abandoning the burial 
service of their loved one.  This is clearly not an option.  In light of 
these considerations, the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion is compelling.  
Mourners’ obvious vulnerability, coupled with their equally obvious 
inability to avoid funeral picketers, makes them sufficiently “captive” 
 161. Id. at 21.  
 162. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 163. Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 364–65 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 164. Id. at 366 (alterations in both) (internal citations omitted). 
 165. E.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729 (2000). 
 166. Strickland, 539 F.3d at 366. 
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to justify finding an important state interest in protecting them 
against noisy or otherwise intrusive activities taking place near funer-
als.167  Thus, the same reasons that allow states to restrict picketing in 
residential areas or near health facilities also justify regulations of 
picketing at funeral sites.168
While a three-judge panel for the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit initially held in Manchester that a state had no 
legitimate interest in protecting mourners’ privacy interests, the court 
recently vacated the panel decision and granted a rehearing en 
banc.
 
169
In Snyder v. Phelps . . . the Court suggested there are likely 
other locations outside of the home and health facilities 
where the government can permissibly regulate First 
Amendment activities. . . . The funeral attendees in Snyder 
were not captive to unwanted communication because the 
main area used by the protesters was approximately 1000 
feet from the site of the funeral, the attendees could see no 
more than the tops of the picket signs, and the picketing did 
not interfere with the funeral. . . . The Court indicated, 
however, that protesters’ “choice of where and when to con-
duct [their] picketing is not beyond the Government’s regu-
latory reach—it is ‘subject to reasonable time, place, or 
manner restrictions’ . . . .”
  The concurring opinion by Judge Murphy may provide an 
illuminating preview of how the court will analyze the case when it is-
sues its forthcoming en banc decision: 
170
Unlike the Eighth Circuit panel’s cursory majority opinion,
 
171 
Judge Murphy’s concurring opinion correctly identifies the relevant 
issue: are funeral attendees “captive to unwanted communication” so 
much so that the situation warrants a governmental intervention in 
the form of a reasonable “time, place, or manner” regulation of pick-
eting near funerals?172  Judge Murphy also rightly views Snyder v. Phelps 
as a useful guidepost for answering this question.173
 
 167. Id. 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 658 F.3d 813, 816–17 (8th Cir. 2011), vacated, 
reh’g en banc granted (Dec. 7, 2011). 
 170. Id. at 818 (Murphy, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).  Judge Murphy 
continued, “I respectfully suggest that Snyder provides the proper method of analysis for 
deciding whether the Manchester ordinance is constitutional.”  Id. 
 171. The majority opinion’s entire First Amendment analysis was contained in two short 
paragraphs.  Id. at 816–17 (majority opinion). 
 172. Id. at 818 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
 173. Id. 
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In Snyder, the Supreme Court declined to hold that Snyder was a 
“captive audience” for the purpose of recognizing the state’s interest 
in enforcing Snyder’s tort claims, mostly because, as the Court em-
phasized, the picketers were so far away from the funeral site that 
Snyder was not even aware of their signs until he returned home and 
saw them on the news later that night.174
As the Court in Snyder noted in dicta, states may subject picketing 
to “reasonable time, place or manner restrictions.”
  Under those circumstances, 
it would strain credulity to hold that Snyder was “captive” to words on 
signs he could not even see from the funeral.  This conclusion, how-
ever, would almost certainly have differed had Phelps, say, been pro-
testing a mere ten feet away from the burial service, and shouting 
loud and offensive slogans at the mourners during the burial cere-
mony.  Under these facts, it is easy to see that the mourners would in-
deed have been a “captive” audience to the disruptive picketers, be-
cause they would not have been able to avoid the speech without 
leaving the funeral of their departed loved one. 
175  Maryland’s fu-
neral picketing law did not exist at the time the events in Snyder trans-
pired,176 but in its current form it is one such reasonable “time, place, 
and manner” regulation.177  As the Sixth Circuit cogently reasoned in 
Strickland, states have an important interest in preventing the disrup-
tion of burial services and protecting the privacy interests of “captive” 
mourners by regulating the time, place, and manner of picketing at 
or near funeral sites.178  The Eighth Circuit was correct to vacate its 
contrary opinion,179
3.  Maryland’s Picketing Statute Is Narrowly Tailored to Achieve Its 
Constitutional Goal 
 and it now has the opportunity to provide a more 
persuasive “captive audience” analysis on rehearing. 
In addition to serving an important governmental interest, Mary-
land’s law is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.  The law prohi-
bits picketing within 500 feet of funerals.180
 
 174. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1221–22 (2011). 
  This distance is greater 
than the 300-foot zone that was properly upheld by the Sixth Circuit 
 175. Id. at 1218 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 
(1984)). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 178. Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 364–66 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 179. Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 658 F.3d 813, 816–17 (8th Cir. 2011), vacated, 
reh’g en banc granted (Dec. 7, 2011).  
 180. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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in Strickland181 but less than the 1,000-foot distance of the picketers in 
Snyder v. Phelps, under which the Supreme Court declined to view Mr. 
Snyder as a “captive audience.”182
As the court in Strickland noted, funeral picketing laws are in 
many respects much narrower than other content-neutral laws that 
the Supreme Court has upheld in the past.  These “buffer zone” laws 
mandate no “‘limitations on the number, size, text, or images’ of pla-
cards, and [] ‘no limitation on the number of speakers or the noise 
level, including the use of amplification equipment.’”
  On balance, Maryland’s law is clos-
er to Strickland in terms of the permitted proximity, which makes the 
restriction more persuasive overall. 
183
[T]he Funeral Protest Provision is in certain aspects narrow-
er than the analogous measures in Frisby, Hill, and Madsen.  
Phelps-Roper is not silenced during a funeral or burial ser-
vice, but must merely stay 300 feet away within a brief win-
dow of time, outside of which she may say what she wants, 
wherever she wants, and when she wants, with no limitation 
on the number of speakers or the noise level, including the 
use of amplification equipment, and no limitations on the 
number, size, text, or images of placards.
  In sum: 
184
This same analysis applies with equal force to Maryland’s statute, 
except that picketers must stay at least 500, rather than 300, feet away.  
Although this distance is 200 feet greater than the buffer zone upheld 
in Strickland, it nonetheless “serves a similar purpose, and . . . protects 
a group of individuals who may arrive and depart from the funeral or 
burial service in a coordinated fashion.”
 
185
 
 181. See supra Part I.C.2. 
  Indeed, while the statute 
 182. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 183. Strickland, 539 F.3d at 370. 
 184. Id. at 371 (footnote omitted). 
 185. Cf. id. at 370 (finding that even though the buffer zone in that case was 200 feet 
greater than the buffer zone in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), it served a similar 
purpose).  Although the 300-foot buffer zone in Strickland was greater than the buffer 
zones previously upheld, Maryland’s 500-foot zone is 200 feet greater still.  While this 
Comment takes the position that the Maryland statute is narrowly tailored, there is some 
merit to the argument that 500 feet may be too great a distance to be considered narrowly 
tailored, given that there is no Supreme Court precedent upholding a radius that large in 
this context.  If picketers were to challenge the Maryland statute, they would be able to 
distinguish Maryland’s 500-foot buffer from existing precedent, including Strickland’s 300-
foot buffer.  Moreover, a 500-foot radius might well extend to private residences, thereby 
interfering with property owners’ right to picket on their own private property.  All other 
things being equal, the smaller the radius, the more likely courts will view the law as being 
narrowly tailored.  Thus, in order to better insulate the law from constitutional attack, the 
Maryland legislature might consider amending the statute to create a 100-, 150- or 300-foot 
zone, instead of the more aggressive 500-foot zone created by current law.     
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in Strickland was somewhat narrower than Maryland’s statute in terms 
of distance,186 the Maryland statute is narrower in terms of time by 
constricting protests only during the funeral rather than for a time 
during, before, and after the funeral as Ohio does.187
4.  Maryland’s Picketing Statute Allows for Ample Alternative 
Channels of Communication for Protesters 
 Overall, there-
fore, the law is narrowly tailored to achieve its constitutional goal. 
Lastly, Maryland’s buffer zone law leaves open ample alternative 
channels of communication through which groups like Westboro can 
freely express their views.  Over the past several decades, Westboro 
has repeatedly expressed its views over the Internet and on television, 
has garnered extensive news coverage, and engaged with citizens in 
public locations throughout the United States.188  Maryland’s funeral 
picketing law affects none of these activities.  Nor does it prevent 
Phelps or any of his congregants in the future from proselytizing 
door-to-door or by telephone; distributing literature in person or by 
mail or email; protesting in public places (other than cemeteries dur-
ing a burial service); appearing on television or radio programs; plac-
ing advertisements in print; publishing books, newsletters, or pamph-
lets; disseminating their views in online social media; or creating as 
many websites as they wish in order to communicate their views.189  
These are ample alternative channels of communication through 
which Westboro or any other group can freely express its beliefs.190
III. CONCLUSION 
 
Snyder v. Phelps was a case surrounded by controversy.  Popular 
disappointment with the outcome is understandable in light of the fo-
rum Fred Phelps and Westboro chose to express their extremely of-
 
 186. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2011) (creat-
ing a 300-foot buffer zone), with MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis 2002 & 
Supp. 2011) (creating a 500-foot buffer zone). 
 187. Compare CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (banning picketing during services), with § 3767.30 
(banning picketing an hour before, during, as well as after services). 
 188. See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. 
 189. Cf. Strickland, 539 F.3d at 372 (“[P]rotestors have not been barred from the resi-
dential neighborhoods.  They may enter such neighborhoods, alone or in groups, even 
marching.  They may go door-to-door to proselytize their views.  They may distribute litera-
ture in this manner or through the mails.  They may contact residents by telephone, short 
of harassment.” (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483–84 (1988))). 
 190. Cf. id. at 373 (“[T]here is no merit to any contention that the Funeral Protest Pro-
vision leaves [Phelps-Roper] without ample alternative channels of communication.”).  
Indeed, it is difficult to see any merit in arguments to the contrary. 
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fensive views.  However, the Court’s opinion in Snyder was ultimately 
correct.191  A sound First Amendment jurisprudence requires that 
speech on issues of public concern be strictly protected, even if such 
speech might occasionally cause emotional harm to private citizens.  
Moreover, allowing plaintiffs to extract monetary damages based on 
the “outrageous” nature of defendants’ speech in IIED claims would 
unconstitutionally empower juries to define the limits of acceptable 
public discourse, contrary to fundamental First Amendment prin-
ciples.192  By contrast, Maryland’s funeral picketing law does not suffer 
from this problem, because it does not impose liability on speech 
based on a subjective standard such as “outrageousness.”  Rather, 
Maryland’s statute is a content-neutral measure193 that is narrowly tai-
lored194 to serve the important governmental interests of protecting 
the privacy of “captive” audiences at funeral services and preventing 
the disruption of burial services.195  The statute also leaves Fred 
Phelps and Westboro with ample alternative channels of communica-
tion through which they can freely express their views.196
 
  For these 
reasons, narrowly drawn picketing regulations are a sensible and con-
stitutional means of protecting the privacy of vulnerable mourners 
from Westboro’s antics.   
 
 191. See supra Part II.A. 
 192. See supra Part II.A. 
 193. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 194. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 195. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 196. See supra Part II.B.4. 
